Abstract-In this paper, we propose a novel practical Certificate-Less digital signing system based on bilinear map pairings defined on super elliptic curve, which is proved more efficiency than some similar systems pioneered heretofore as viewed from information security application widely applied in mobile-thin computation environment often with a narrow communication bandwidth concomitant. For a long span, the complex managing public key certificate job involved in crypto-system based on identity has been keeping from a more efficient digital signing and disturbing engineers engaging in designing secure mobile E-Commerce. By this scheme, signing subroutine can be in no need of pairscomputation, and verifying can be performed only at cost of 3 times pairs-computation while not introducing special hash function, a necessity in some similar schemes initiated in some references. With respect to security, the system manifests a satisfying immunity from Replacing Public Key Attack, Forging Signature Attack and some other typical attack methods from angle of computability of NP-problem and of provable security. By comparison and analysis in detail and in depth, it is made clear that the signing system can provide a favorable macro-availability and performance, and be fit to be promoted into the application of mobile ECommerce and some similar requirements.
I. INTRODUCTION
For the purpose of putting off the burden of digital certificate management, a crypto-system based on the identity was pioneered [1] . However, the inherent problem arises as an accompanist in the encryption system based on the identity, i.e. the task of key-trust, which should be performed by a separated authority named Private Key Generator, abbreviated by PKG which is enabled to absolutely control private key information of all participants. Thus, to some PKGs which have evil intentions, there are some possibilities that they forge some participants' signature and in whose name to grasp at some interest and right, while cheating them [2] . In recent years, researching on novel signature schemes or innovated cryptosystems has been a focus of attention in the area of information security.
A. Previous work
An idea of Certificate-Less Public Key Crypto System, which abbreviated by CL-PKCS, was initiated in [2] . CL-PKCS doesn't involve the job of key-trust, a necessity in the crypto-system based on the identity, so, it is in no need of her or his public key certificated and approved by the certificate authority. By comparison, to a certain extent, it spares a lot of cost and enables itself fitter for security application designed for the mobile computation environment with low wattage-output and narrow communication bandwidth. Since then, CL-PKCS catches crypto professionals' eyes, and many scenarios of CL-PKCS are devised [3] - [5] .
B. Our contributions
In the course of survey and experiment, a novel practical algorithm of certificate-less digital signing is proposed, for which foundation is laid by the bilinear map parings defined on super-elliptic curve, and in contrast which saves some times of pairing computation in the phrase of signing and of verifying. In addition, the scheme doesn't needs extra function which maps from message to point and especial hash function from stem to stern.
Compared with some homologous schemes pioneered heretofore, its macro-performance has more attraction to those security applications to be deployed in thin-client platforms.
II. SOME CONCERNED FUNDAMENTALS

A. Basic Notations
Some basic notations used throughout the paper are specified in Table I , and the left ones are explained where referred.
B. Bilinear Map Pairings and Characteristics
Definition 1. Let G 1 be a cyclic additive group with a prime order p, P is a generator of G 1 for which P ∈ G 1 , and let G 2 be a cyclic multiplicative group with prime order p . Define a map as (1) , and its characteristics are as follows [4] .ê
2). Non-degenerative. For any nonzero-element P 1 and some S for which P 1 ∈ G 1 , S ∈ G 1 and equation (3) is satisfied only on condition of S = O , in other words be zero-element of G 1 .ê
3).Computable. For any P 1 , P 2 ∈ G 1 there is found a practical algorithm to compute (4) .
Such a map as above is defined bilinear map. The theory of elliptic curve function reveals that bilinear map can be constructed by Weil-Pairing or Tate-Paring on super singularity elliptic curve. As to such bilinear map defined over super elliptic curve on limited field, P is treated as a certain point on elliptic curve; and G 1 as a group with a defined add-operation named pointadding and with a set of all points on super-elliptic curve and the infinity point; and G 2 as a group with a defined multiplication-operation named modular-p-multiplication and with a set of modular-p-residual integers, and O denotes the infinity point. 
C. Hardness Hypothesis
Definition 2.Elliptic Curve Discrete Logarithm Problem. Given 2 groups G 1 , G 2 , and 2 distinctive points P ∈ G 1 , Q ∈ G 1 , extract some integer x ∈ G 2 subject to (5) .This problem is defined the Elliptic Curve Discrete Logarithm Problem, abbreviated by ECDLP [6] . There hasn't been devised a polynomial time algorithm to it. In computational complexity theory, NP is one of the most fundamental complexity classes. The abbreviation NP refers to "Nondeterministic Polynomial time". Intuitively, NP is the set of all decision problems for which the root can't be verifiable or recognized in polynomial-running-time by a deterministic Turing machine. Obviously, ECDLP is an element in NP.
Definition 3. q -Strong-Diffle-Hellman-Problem. Given 2 groups G 1 , G 2 , a certain prime q , another integer a ∈ G 2 ,any point P ∈ G 1 and a q + 1 tuple (P, aP, a 2 P, ..., a q P ) , and given a random integer c ∈ G 2 ,the problem of how to compute (6) is defined qStrong-Diffle-Hellman-Problem, abbreviated by q-SDHP [7] . The principles of Number Theory reveal that q-SDHP is a known problem as a member of NP .
Definition 4. Negligible Quantum. Let p(·) be a positive polynomial of n for which there always exists a certain integer N , subject to n > N and (7), ε(n) be another positive polynomial, then we say that the function ε(n) is negligible, and name it Negligible Quantum. In Theory of Probability,if probability of some matter is a Negligible Quantum, that is to say that such matter occurs impossibly at all.
Definition 5. Probability Algorithm for q-SDHP. Let A be a certain algorithm, by which the probability to correctly answer q-SDHP, denoted by ε , i.e. can be expressed by (8) .
Then to say A is an algorithm with oddment of ε to solve q-SDHP over in favor. In cryptography, most of methods of attack against crypto-system are some probability algorithm. If probability of which are some negligible quantum, they are threats beyond security. Hypothesis 1. Security Hypothesis for q-SDHP. If there exists an algorithm by which it spends time t at most to solve q-SDHP over (G 1 , G 2 ) with oddment of ε, then we say that q-SDHP over (G 1 , G 2 ) is problem with difficulty parameters (t, ε).
D. Model of Random Oracle Machine
Hash function plays an important part in security proof of crypto-scheme. During the course of proving security, an algorithm denoted by A is always devised as a challenger to attack the crypto-system in question. Random Oracle Machine is proposed as a challenge attack model which abstracted from prototype of hash function [8] .
Definition 6.Random Oracle Machine.Hash function as (9) ,which can be characterized by 3 items as follows.
Uniformity: output of H is distributed in the scale of {0, 1} n uniformly. Determinability: if inputs of H are alike, outputs of H are equal determinedly.
Availability: given an input bit-string x , output H(x) can have been extracted in time of polynomial expression of length of x, in other words, which can be depicted by a P-class problem [9] .
Hash function as (8) subject to mentioned be defined as a Random Oracle Machine.
Definition 7. Model of Random Oracle Machine. In the course of proving security of crypto-system, if a certain Random Oracle Machine is introduced, such proof architecture is defined as Model of Random Oracle Machine, abbreviated by ROM.
III. A NOVEL DIGITAL SIGNATURE SYSTEM
The digital signature scheme based on bilinear pairing proposed consists of 7 sub-algorithms include: construction of system, extraction of partial private key, extraction of secret parameters, setting private key, setting public key, generation of signature, and verifying signature. There are 3 entities involved as follows: Key Generating Center which abbreviated by KGC, signer and verifier.
A. Algorithm to Construct system
At the beginning, KGC performs some tasks as follows.
1.Chose groups G 1 , G 2 and construct a bilinear mapê over G 1 , G 2 .
2.Select a generator P ∈ G 1 randomly, and compute (10) subject to g be a generator g ∈ G 2 . g =ê(P, P )
3. Chose s ∈ G 2 randomly as a master key, and set P pub by (11) ,which treated as the public key of system.
4. Define two hash functions as (12) and (13). After steps as above, a system parameter set is gotten as (14), denoted by para ,where master key should be kept secret.
B. Algorithm to Extract Partial Private Key
The fore 2 steps of the job of Extracting partial private key is requested to be executed by KGC, and last step is performed by signer denoted as j . On the whole, it is an interactive accordance process between KGC and signer.
Firstly, Compute (15) to extract identity information and authenticate identity of signer denoted as j.
Secondly, by computing (16) to extract P pri as a part of input which determines the private key of signer , and send it to signer j over a secure channel.
At last, signer j verifies correctness and originality of by checking equality of equation (17). If incorrect parameters are used by KGC or mistake instructions away from the protocol are executed by KGC , its equality can't be satisfied.ê
C
. Algorithm to Extract Secret Parameter
After getting data-structure of para, signer j picks out x j ∈ G 2 randomly as a second part of his own private key, and which should be kept secret.
D. Algorithm to Setup Private Key
On condition that 3 variables are known such as system parameter para, the partial private key generated by KGC, and x j ∈ G 2 randomly picked out by signer j as a second part of private key, by computing (18) signer j integrates them and setups his private key denoted by K j−pri , which should be kept carefully in confidence as his signing secret private key.
E. Algorithm to Setup Public Key
On the basis of para and x j ∈ G 2 , by computing (19) signer j extracts his public key denoted by K j−pub = (X j , Y j ) , which paired with his private key K j−pri by sharing x j .
F. Algorithm to Generate Signature
Signer j makes use of signing secret private key to sign message m as following steps.
1.Chose r ∈ G 2 randomly, and compute (20).
2.By (21) compute message digest value of m ,denoted by h , which mixed with a random Initial Vector rr ,which revealing the volatile-random and one-off identity information of signer j .
3.Sign h and r according to (22) and get the signature item denoted by S.Mix message digest value h, one-off identity information of signer r with the steady-going identity information of signer j K j−pri and get signature item.
Then, (h, S) is a valid signature of m from signer j .
G. Algorithm to Verify Signature
When verifier denoted by v receives message m attached with signature (h, S) signed by signer j who declares he can be identified by ID j , and his public key be K j−pub . Verifier v can authenticate signature (h, S) ,message m ,K j−pub and KGC by executing instructions as follows.
1.Check equality of (23). If result is false, then break off verifying and reject signature, else go to next step. Falseness reveals that the dependency between signer j and KGC is in question.
2.Retrieve identity information of signer j ID j from KGC and get q j by (15) then compute rr by (24). This step confirms authenticity of signer firstly, and intend to restore the volatile-random and one-off ID-information of signer j denoted by rr through inherent mathematical dependence between signature ,ID-information and public key of signer which in turn can authenticate signature.
3.Check equality of (25). If false is returned, then output rejecting, else output acceptance. By step 2, the volatile-random and one-off identity information of signer j denoted by rr can be restored, which is used as an initial vector in hash operation. If rr be correct and m be untouched, the message digest value of rehashing rr and m can't but equal to h .
IV. CORRECTNESS PROOF AND PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS OF SYSTEM
A. Correctness Proof of Signature System
If (h, S) is a valid signature of message m signed by private key which is paired with public key K j−pub ,then some mathematical relation should be satisfied ,which can prove correctness of signature system,and its proof as follows.
Proof. 1. Check validity of public key of KGC and public key of signer j.Bilinear Map value of (26) is denoted by w .
By (19) and (11), (26) is transformed into (27). According to bilinear characteristic of mapê , w is rewritten by (28) according to (10) .
Bilinear Map value of (29) is denoted by w .
By (19) and (11), (29) is transformed into (30). According to bilinear characteristic of mapê , w is rewritten by (31) according to (10) .
Obviously,w equals to w , which can be seen from (28) and (31).The equality proves that key pair containing K j−pub as the public key is generated through the cooperation involving KGC for real.
2. Check pairing validity of public key and signing secret key of signer j.Get identity information of signer j q j by (15), and try to extract (32), result denoted by rr determined by S ,h , K j−pub .
By (20) and (17), (32) is changed into (33).
By (16), (33) is rewritten by (34).
rr =ê((r + h)
According to bilinear characteristic of mapê , rr is rewritten by (35) according to (10) .
Cancel (35) and By (10) , rr can be expressed as (36).
Considering (36) and (20), if all security variables and signature keep untouched during the period from signing to verifying, rr can't but equal to rr . In other words rr which represents the volatile-random and one-off identity information of signer j can be restored by bilinear map operation.
3.Check signing validity of signature (h, S), Detach m ,h from the signed message, and rehash m with Initiate Vector rr extracted in the fore step, the result denoted by h ,as (37)
Check the equality between h and h ,which should be satisfied if message m isn't be tampered with and rr is correctly restored. On the contrary, any of conditions is unsatisfying ,there equality relationship doesn't exist.
Summarily ,the signing system be correct.
B. Comparison and analysis of Performance
In many references, a lot of research and exploration which is located on complexity of computation bilinear pairing and on how to speed up computing bilinear pairing is taken into action, and most of corresponding achievement floats on water. 
However, computation bilinear pairing is still a high time-consuming job. The direct result is that the signing program based on computation bilinear pairing still running at slower than required speed which hinged on bilinear pairing computing speed and times of atomic paring computation involved in signing system itself. So, reducing and optimizing configuration of atomic computation of system is constructive to speed up running of system. 
We compare this signature scheme with those proposed in references [2, 5, 6] as viewed from configuration of atomic computation such as times of pairing computation, point-multiplication on G 1 and application of special function. It is presupposed that all schemes are based on the same environment of parameters (G 1 , G 2 ,ê) .
In our scheme, there is no costing pairing computation in signing step because pre-computation (9) is published as a system parameter, while there are 3 times of bilinear pairing computation in use in the step of verifying. On the other hand,it only introduces 2 regular cryptographic secure hash functions,and doesn't need Map-to-Point hash function which is a necessity in other similar schemes and which is low-efficient computationally. The configuration of atomic computation of other schemes are listed in detail in Table II ,and some abbreviated operations are specified in Table III .By comparison it is revealed that this scheme demonstrates a more optimal macro atomic-computationconfiguration.
V. SECURITY PROOF OF SCHEME
A. Provable Security
Some early crypto-systems or crypto-protocols were developed on the basis of some difficult problems. However, theirs security haven't been proved strictly. Security provable method is a highlight of research in the field of crypto-system in recent years, which is similar with proof method named reduction to absurdity often used in math [10] . Reduction steps are as follows.
1. Introduce some hypothesis of hard problem. The hypothesis indicates that the success probability of solving a hard math problem is a Negligible Quantum.
2. Define security model. Security model is a key of the proof method. RO model and standard model are in common use. In the architecture of provable security, security model sometimes should be depicted from both aspects of attack action and attack goal. E.g. Replacing Public Key Attack and Forging Signature Attack [11] .
3. Reduce and conclude based on security model. In ROM model, it is supposed that adversary can break security of scheme at a non-negligible probability, and then manage to solve some primary mathematic hard problem. Whereas, in standard model, the purpose is to demonstrate the formal security so-called which often roots in the complexity of supposition problem well known. For example, 1024-bits Integer Factoring Problem.
B. Public Key Replacement Attack
In the circle of certificate-less signature, Replacing Public Key Attack must be paid enough attention because of signer's public key which doesn't experience compulsive certification. That is to say it isn't a public key certificate [3] , [4] . However, it can be proved that Replacing Public Key Attack has no chance of succeeding against this scheme.
Proof. As to Replacing Public Key Attack, it is a premise for any adversary that he needs to succeed in replacing public key of signer j K j−pub = (X j , Y j ) with a forged public key K j −pub = (X j , Y j ). Because of (13) being public and K j−pub which extracted from x j , an adversary attempt to select x j and to publish a K j−pub disguising himself as signer j.
The signing private key K j−pri in (16) is paired with K j−pub , the verifying public key of signer j and which is generated from 2 secret values x j and s . In addition that adversary can extract q j because ID j and H 1 are known and public. However, secret value x j is the knowledge known only and uniquely by signer j , and secret value is the information known only and uniquely by KGC. Both conditions of the mentioned make it be a negligible quantum the probability of success in informing x j and s by guessing randomly.
So, the forged public key K j −pub = (X j , Y j ) doesn't pair with K j−pri , while the public key K j−pub paired with K j−pri is non-forged. Replacing Public Key Attack has no access of success.
C. Forging Signature Attack
By this scheme, signing is done on the basis of identity information which is public completely and owned by signer j. In addition, KGC controls partial information of signing private key of signer j . That is to say if chances of succeeding in forging signature for KGC full of hostility are more than other adversary? The answer is "No".
Proof: According to the process of the scheme, it is well known that KGC has access to control such information as system master key s , system public key P pub and part of signer's private key P pri . In order to forge signature of signer j , KGC manages to forge the signing key of signer j as (16). P pri is generated in step-B and controlled by KGC, and only x j is unknown which is picked out randomly by signer j.
Where does KGC look for signs of x j ? Obviously, the public key K j−pub is extracted from x j by equation (17). If KGC can find out x j on condition of a known pair (X j , P ) or (Y j , P pub ) , then it succeeds in solving an instance of ECDLP, which contradicts security hypothesis that at present there doesn't exist a practical algorithm to solve ECDLP at a cost of polynomial time [11] , [12] .
So, there is no path to Forging Signature Attack. In addition, in essence this scheme is a descendant of crypto-system based on identity proposed in reference [1] . It is proved that breaking it is equivalent to solving q-SDHP in the model of random oracle machine,as to both chosen-message-attack, and identity-attack, forging signature,and contradicts security Hypothesis 1. Thus, it is secure in the circle of Random Oracle Machine.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
Certificate-Less signing system is a novel scenario of digital signature in recent years, which reduces public key crypto-system, while not being entangled with key-trust and providing favorable operating rate and computation efficiency built in signing scheme based on identity .
In this paper, we propose a novel practical certificateless digital signing system based on bilinear map pairings defined on super-elliptic curve. It is proved to be more efficiency than some similar systems pioneered heretofore.
By this scheme, signing subroutine is in no need of pairs-computation, and verifying is performed only at cost of 3 times of pairs-computation while not introducing special hash function, a necessity in some similar schemes initiated in some references. With respect to security, the system manifests a satisfying immunity from Replacing Public Key Attack, Forging Signature Attack and some other typical attack methods from angle of computability of NP-problems and provable security.
By comparison and analysis in detail and in depth, it is made clear that the signing system can provide a favorable macro-availability and performance, and be fit for security application in the environment of mobile computation with low watt.
